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legislative approach or a more full-reasoned body of case law, sensitive to the
rights of both private owners and the public, is necessary.
III. CONCLUSION
The opinion in Coastal Industrial Water Authority v. York has created a
new standard for riparian boundaries in coastal areas. A change in the riparian
boundary, such as that caused by subsidence, which is not the result of an
ordinary hazard of riparian ownership, will be ineffective to alter the bound-
ary between the lands of the private owner and the public lands beneath
coastal waters. Such a result is consistent with those cases which have dealt
with submergence, a related riparian phenomenon, and indicates a sensitivity
on the part of the court to the unique problems faced by coastal landowners.
Any uncertainty of result which Coastal introduces into riparian law may
simply reflect the difficulty presented when doctrines based on riparian
phenomena peculiar to rivers and lakes are applied to cases involving land
riparian to the Gulf coast.
The court's solution, retention of private ownership to subsided lands, may
lead to future conflicts between the rights of the private landowner and the
rights of the public to the use of coastal resources. The court was careful to
note that these conflicts did not exist in this case because the submerged land
in question was not actually used for navigation by the public.6" It is left to
future decisions to illuminate whether a different rule will apply in the case of
submergence beneath coastal water which is or could be used for public
navigation.
Aimee Hess Conlan
Kelley v. Rinkle: Texas Embraces the Discovery
Rule in Credit Libel
On March 13, 1973, Dr. Roy Rinkle, defendant, submitted a voluntary
report to Credit Bureau Services, a credit reporting agency, which stated that
plaintiff, George W. Kelley, owed $277 on an account past due. Plaintiff had
previously applied for credit with several business firms, and during April and
May of 1973 he began receiving negative responses from those firms based on
information supplied by Credit Bureau Services. Plaintiff first learned of
defendant's credit report on August 29, 1973, and subsequently filed an action
for libel on March 26, 1974. The trial court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff's suit was barred by the
one-year statute of limitations applicable to libel actions.' The court of civil
60. 532 S.W.2d at 954; see note 57 supra.
I. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5524 (1958) provides in part that "tlhere shall be
commenced and prosecuted within one year after the cause of action shall have accrued, and not
afterward, all actions or suits in courts of the following description: I. Actions for malicious
prosecution or for injuries done to the character or reputation of another by libel or slander."
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appeals affirmed, 2 and the Texas Supreme Court granted plaintiff's applica-
tion for writ of error. Held, reversed: The limitations period for a cause of
action for libel of one's credit reputation by publication of a defamatory
report to a credit agency begins to run when the defamed person learns or by
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of the existence of
the credit report. Kelley v. Rinkle, 532 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. 1976).
I. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND THE DISCOVERY RULE
A limitation of the time during which an action may be brought is created by
statutory law. 3 The purpose behind these statutes is the prevention of stale or
fraudulent claims. The assumptions underlying the establishment of time
limits are (1) that a plaintiff will not delay in bringing a meritorious claim, and
(2) that the ability to determine the true facts of a case decreases with time. 4
Another consideration behind the statutes may be the desire to relieve the
courts of the burden of adjudicating inconsequential or tenuous claims. 5 The
time periods selected by the legislature may vary with the degree of perma-
nence of the evidence ordinarily required in a particular type of case; they
may also indicate the relative favor with which the legislature views certain
types of claims or particular classes of plaintiffs. 6
A typical statute of limitations provides that the period within which an
action may be brought is to be computed from the time the cause of action
"accrues. " Legislatures, by employing this phrase, have adopted a substan-
tive law concept describing that combination of facts which will allow
plaintiff to sue; thus, the time of the occurrence of the last of these facts
becomes the critical point of inquiry.7 Through a determination of when a
cause of action accrues, courts have introduced an element of flexibility into
statutes of limitations. A cause of action has generally been said to accrue
when it comes into existence as an enforceable claim, when a right of action
becomes vested in a plaintiff, or when a plaintiff is entitled to sue on his
claim. 8 The statutory period may begin to run when defendant allegedly
commits the wrong or when substantial harm occurs. When considerable time
intervenes between the two, courts have generally looked to the substantive
elements of the cause of action on which the suit is based.9 Under the
long-standing rule in Texas when an act is not itself unlawful as to plaintiff so
2. 524 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975).
3. See Harper, Texas Adopts the Discovery Rule for Limitations in Medical Malpractice
Actions, I ST. MARY'S L.J. 77 (1969).
4. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177 (1950). The
writers of this comprehensive analysis of statutes of limitations stated that "[tihe primary
consideration underlying such legislation is undoubtedly one of fairness to the defendant. There
comes a time when he ought to be secure in his reasonable expectation that the slate has been
wiped clean of ancient obligations, and he ought not to be called on to resist a claim" if memories
have faded and evidence and witnesses have disappeared. Id. at 1185.
5. Id. at 1200.
6. Id. Since legislative opinion will change with time and with the composition of the
legislature, limitations statutes should be periodically subjected to legislative consideration. See
note 54 infra and accompanying text.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Leahey v. Department of Water & Power, 76 Cal. App. 2d 281, 173 P.2d 69
(1946); Berger v. Jackson, 156 Fla. 251,23 So. 2d 265 (1945); In reNorth's Estate, 320 S.W.2d 597
(Mo. App. 1959).
9. Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 1200.
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that harm is an essential element in the cause of action, the occurrence of the
harm marks the accrual of the cause of action and the commencement of the
statutory period. But when the act itself is a legal injury to plaintiff so that suit
can be maintained regardless of damage, plaintiff's right of action accrues and
the statute begins to run when the wrongful act is complete, despite plaintiff's
ignorance or inability to learn of his cause of action.10
In certain limited types of cases Texas courts have adopted the discovery
rule which states that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until
plaintiff learns or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned
of the injury giving rise to his right of action. I" Although it has been applied
with some hestitation, the discovery rule approach to limitations statutes in
tort actions has found increasing favor in Texas as well as in most other
jurisdictions. 2 The rule has been applied in cases of fraud,' 3 in actions for
property damage, 4 in suits for reformation of a deed,' 5 and, recently, in an
action against a drug manufacturer for breach of warranty.16
The clearest indication of a growing acceptance in Texas of the discovery
rule is found in the area of professional malpractice.' 7 In Atkins v. Crosland'8
the Texas Supreme Court ruled that a cause of action against an accountant
for negligent preparation of an income tax return accrues when the resulting
tax deficiency is assessed. 9 The court's reasoning in Atkins was consistent
with former cases,20 but the decision's effect was similar to that of the
10. Houston Water Works v. Kennedy, 70 Tex. 233, 8 S.W. 36 (1888). See also Tennessee
Gas Transmission Co, v. Fromme, 153 Tex. 352, 269 S.W.2d 336 (1954). See generally Develop-
ments in the Law, supra note 4.
II. SeeGaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967). SeealsoRozny v. Marnul, 43 111. 2d 54,
250 N.E.2d 656 (1969); Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961).
12. See, e.g., Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart& Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176,491 P.2d 421,
98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971) (action for legal malpractice); Layton v. Allen, 246 A.2d 794 (Del. 1968);
Basque v. Yuk Lin Liau, 50 Hawaii 397,441 P.2d 636 (1968) (action for damage to real property);
Rozny v. Marnul, 43 III. 2d 54,250 N. E.2d 656 (1969); Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 150
N.W.2d 94 (1967) (action for defective design); Polzin v. National Co-op. Refinery Ass'n, 175
Kan. 531, 266 P.2d 293 (1954) (action for damages for water pollution); Fernandi v. Strully, 35
N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961); Flanagan v. Mt. Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427,248 N.E.2d 871,
301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969); Frohs v. Greene, 88 Ore. 131,452 P.2d 564 (1969); Janisch v. Mullins, I
Wash. App. 393, 461 P.2d 895 (1969) (actions for medical malpractice).
13. See, e.g., Wise v. Anderson, 163 Tex. 608, 359 S.W.2d 876 (1962); Quinn v. Press, 135
Tex. 60, 140 S.W.2d 438 (1940); Glenn v. Steele, 141Tex. 565, 61 S.W.2d 810 (1933); Blondeau v.
Sommer, 139 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App,-Galveston 1940, writ ref'd); American Indem. Co. v.
Ernst & Ernst, 106 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1937, writ ref'd).
14. See, e.g., Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Anderson, 514 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1974), aff'd, 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1975); Crawford v. Yeatts, 395 S.W.2d 413 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Geochemical Surveys v. Dietz, 340 S.W.2d 114
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Alexander, 291 S.W.2d 792
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), aff'dpercuriam, 295 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. 1956); Beck v. American Rio
Grande Land & Irrigation Co., 39 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1931, writ ref'd).
15. See, e.g., Barker v. Levy, 507 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
16. Thrift v. Tenneco Chems., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
17. The early rule was that a cause of action in professional negligence accrues when
defendant breaches his duty to maintain a professional standard of care. See, e.g., Stewart v.
Janes, 393 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1965, writ ref'd), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 962
(1966); Crawford v. Davis, 148 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1941, no writ).
18. 417 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. 1967).
19. Id. The court based its holding on the fact that until the tax deficiency was assessed the
tort was incomplete because legal injury was not the inevitable result of the accountant's
negligent act, and until a "legal injury," rather than a technical breach of duty, or an economic
injury is sustained, there is no cause of action. See note 10 supra and accompanying text; Note,
Limitations of Actions, 46 TEXAS L. REV. 119 (1967).
20. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
discovery rule: the tax assessment served to inform plaintiff of his right of
action and thereby enabled him to bring suit within the limitations period.
In recent years Texas courts have frequently applied the discovery rule in
the area of medical malpractice. In Gaddis v. Smith"' the decision was
explicitly limited to foreign objects cases,22 but the court's opinion did not
completely foreclose the possibility of applying the discovery rule in other
instances. 23 Five years later Texas expanded its application of the discovery
rule in Hays v. Hall2 4 to include malpractice cases arising from vasectomy
operations. Discussing the Gaddis ruling, the Hays court explained that
Gaddis involved not an extension of the limitations period, but a recognition
"that in certain situations it is difficult if not altogether impossible to discover
the existence of a legal injury. . . . [T]he Statute of Limitations commences
to run from discovery of the injury, or the time discovery should reasonably
have been made." 25 Texas courts have subsequently applied the discovery
rule to other types of medical malpractice claims. 26 In a recent case the court
of appeals based its extension of the rule on the language of the Hays opinion 27
which it interpreted as broadening the permissible application of the discov-
ery rule in Texas. 28
Texas case law in the area of credit libel is both sparse and ambiguous. The
opinion in Bratcher v. Pecos Motors, Inc.29 implied but did not specifically
21. 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967). The Texas Supreme Court had refused to apply the rule to
medical malpractice cases since Carrell v. Denton, 138 Tex. 145, 157 S.W.2d 878 (1942), in which
it had held that a cause of action for medical malpractice involving the negligent leaving of a
foreign object in the body of the patient accrued when the physician closed the incision at the
conclusion of the surgery.
22. 417 S.W.2d at 581. The court's majority reasoned that the discovery rule could be applied
in foreign objects cases, those in which a foreign object is left in the body of the patient by the
physician, without endangering the policy behind the statute of limitations. While the court
recognized the possibility that physicians might encounter difficulty in preserving evidence with
which to defend discovery rule actions, it found the rule justified on the basis of fairness and
because of the minimal possibility of fraud in foreign objects cases.
23. Quoting from the opinion in Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277,286 (1961), the
court said: "For present purposes we need not question these instances for we are satisfied that
the case at hand falls within a special grouping or 'class of cases' . . . where the period of
limitations may . . . justly be said to begin to run when the plaintiff knows or has any reason to
know about the foreign object and the existence of a cause of action based upon its presence
.... 417 S.W.2d at 581 (emphasis added).
24. 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972).
25. Id. at 413-14 (emphasis added). Applying the reasoning in Gaddis to the facts in Hays, the
court stated that "[i]f the limitation period is measured from the date of the operation, and if the
discovery of fertility, and therefore the injury, is not made until after the period of limitation has
run, the result is that legal remedy is unavailable to the injured party before he can know that he is
injured. A result so absurd and so unjust ought not to be possible." 488 S.W.2d at 414.
26, See, e.g., Nichols v. Smith, 507 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. 1974) (negligent severing of vagus
nerve); Sanchez v. Wade, 514 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, no writ) (improper
diagnosis).
27. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
28. Grady v. Faykus, 530 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
29. 408 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Bratcher held that
when a seller wrongfully reported the cancellation of a sales transaction by mutual agreement
between seller and buyer as a "repossession," buyer's suit for injury to his credit reputation filed
two years after seller's report was barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to
defamation suits. Another approach offered for the Kelley court's consideration was suggested
by Wilson v. Retail Credit Co., 438 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1971), in which a federal court, applying
Mississippi law, held that a cause of action in credit libel arose and the statute began to run on the
date that the credit report was received by the agency's customers. A third approach urged upon
the Texas court in Kelley was that of Weaver v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 199 Va. 196, 98 S.E.2d 687
(1957), where the court held that if the republication of a libelous credit report was a natural and
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hold that a false report to a credit agency was a publication of libel sufficient
to start the running of the limitations period. The transition from the Texas
courts' use of the discovery rule in medical malpractice cases to their
application of the rule to other fact situations was a smooth and logical one
notwithstanding the aberration of the Bratcher decision. The Texas Supreme
Court's opinions in Gaddis and Hays indicate that the court may have been
willing to consider applying the rule in credit libel several years before Kelley
was filed.
II. KELLEY V. RINKLE
A. Application of the Discovery Rule
While Kelley represents a new application of the discovery rule and a new
direction for credit libel in Texas, the case can also be viewed as simply a
reflection of a nationwide mood. There exists today an intensifying national
awareness of the role that credit plays in personal and business affairs and a
corresponding national pressure for protection of the consumer.3" This
national mood has found prompt recognition and support in some of the
nation's courts.3 ' By adopting the discovery rule approach to the statute of
limitations for credit libel, the Texas Supreme Court has added its weight to
the forces of consumerism currently at work in the United States.32
Kelley also raises the issues of the relationship between the discovery rule
and the accrual of a cause of action and the problems which inevitably
accompany the application of the rule. Texas courts have said that a cause of
action accrues when facts exist which authorize one asserting a claim "to
seek relief in a court of competent jurisdiction. 3 3 As Gaddis, Hays, and
Kelley illustrate, however, the considerations which determine the factual
components that plaintiff must plead and prove do not themselves necessarily
fix the appropriate time limits for the filing of a suit. It is not surprising,
therefore, that courts have often failed to carry out the legislative directive
that the limitation period begin to run when the cause of action "accrues" and
probable consequence of the original publication, the statute began to run at the time of the
republication. Brief for Petitioner at 9-10, Kelley v. Rinkle, 532 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. 1976).
30. Recent legislation reflecting this mood includes the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15U.S.C. § 1691 (Supp. V, 1975), the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970), and theTruth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-66j (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975). See generally
Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1973); Tom Olesker's Exciting World of
Fashion, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 61 I1. 2d 129, 334 N.E.2d 160 (1975); P. CROWN, LEGAL
PROTECTION FOR THE CONSUMER (1963).
31. See, e.g., Hood v. Dun& Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25 (5thCir. 1973)(action by building
contractor for libel predicated upon an allegedly false and defamatory credit report provided bydefendant); Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 61 Ill. 2d
129, 334 N.E.2d 160 (1975) (action by clothing retailer for defamation by national credit agency).
The Kelley court noted that Exciting World of Fashion signaled Illinois' adoption of the discovery
rule for libel actions under circumstances similar to those present in Kelley. 532 S.W.2d at 949
n.2.
32. The Texas Supreme Court noted in Kelley that "'[w]hile the pervasive use of credit
reporting agencies makes acquisition of credit much easier and more efficient, it also creates apotential for great abuse by those who would use the system wrongfully to injure the credit
reputation of another. . . .[A] rule by which the limitations would commence from the date of
the wrongdoer's report to the credit agency would merely enhance that potential. " 532 S.W.2d at
949.
33. Williams v. Pure Oil Co., 124 Tex. 341,345, 78 S.W.2d 929,931 (1935). See also H artman
v. Hartman, 135 Tex. 596, 138 S.W.2d 802 (1940).
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have devised numerous exceptions to their original interpretations of that
term in order to avoid injustice.34
Rather than redefining the point at which a particular cause of action
accrues, the discovery rule offers an equitable exception to the traditional
rule that the statute of limitations begins to run at the time a cause of action
accrues. 35 The Texas Supreme Court failed to make this distinction in Gaddis,
but the language of the Kelley opinion seems to indicate the court's recogni-
tion of it. 36 To interpret the discovery rule as changing the time at which a
cause of action accrues would be to say either that the courts have redefined
the term "accrue" or that they have expanded the elements of the causes of
action to which they have applied the rule so as to include the element of
knowledge, or the reasonable possibility of it, by a plaintiff. While it is
obvious that one cannot maintain an action until he knows of his right to do so,
no court has yet held that such knowledge is an element of any cause of
action.
Courts have generally held that since harm is an essential element in
negligence actions, the statute should not begin to run until the incidence of
the harm. 7 The Texas Supreme Court adopted the discovery rule in Gaddis
and Hays in order to achieve results consistent with this policy. In Kelley,
however, the court confronted an even more inflexible situation. The law of
defamation is less malleable than the law of medical malpractice. General
damages are presumed from the very fact of publication in libel,39 and so the
negligent or malicious act and the harm coincide to trigger the running of the
statute. " 'Publication,' " said the Kelley court, "is a word of art . . .
defined in the Restatement, Torts § 577 (1938) as 'communication intention-
ally or by a negligent act to one other than the person defamed.' Thus, there
was a publication of the report when respondent gave it to Credit Bureau
Services .... 4 Applying the general rule regarding statutes of limitations
in tort actions to Kelley, then, the tort was complete and the statute began to
34. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971). Referring
specifically to the exceptions developed in medical malpractice cases, the author states: "Thus
the negligent treatment . . . is held to continue until the relation of physician and patient has
ended; or the court finds fraudulent concealment of the damage, which tolls the running of the
statute; or it finds 'constructive' fraud in silence with probable knowledge; or the failure to
discover and remove the. . . foreign object left in the plaintiff's body is held to be 'continuing'
negligence." Id. at 144; see. e.g., Morrison v. Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 198 P.2d 590(1948); Hotelling v.
Walther, 169 Ore. 559, 130 P.2d 944 (1942); Samuelson v. Freeman, 75 Wash. 2d 894,454 P.2d 406
(1969).
35. See note 10 supra and accompanying text. This is not to say that courts are not free to
review their interpretations of the term "accrue," but only that they have not seriously done so.
See Berry v. Branner, 245 Ore. 307, 421 P.2d 996, 998-99 (1966), in which the court insisted that it
is distinctly the province of the courts to determine the time at which a cause of action accrues,
but in which the court also subscribed to the traditional view that "accrue" means the time at
which a suit can be maintained upon a cause of action.
36. 532 S.W.2d at 948.
37. See, e.g., Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. 1967).
38. Injury in medical malpractice cases is generally thought to occur at the time of the
negligent act. While medical malpractice is not a new area of the law, it was not a heavily litigated
field until the 1960s. Thus, it is conceivable that the concept of the time of injury was open to
redefinition by the Texas court in Gaddis, or at least to determination by the court on an ad hoc
basis. See generally Sandor, The History of Professional Liability Suits in the United States, 163
J.A.M.A. 459 (1957); Stetler, The History of Reported Medical Professional Liability Cases, 30
TEMP. L.Q. 366 (1957).
39. See W. PROSSER, supra note 34, § 112.
40. 532 S.W.2d at 948.
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run when defendant submitted his credit report to the agency. An exception
was again necessary if the court was to effect a just and consistent result.
The eventual adoption of the discovery rule was probably inevitable, even
if the Texas court had approached Kelley in the manner suggested by Wilson
v. Retail Credit Co.4 which held that a cause of action in credit libel arose and
the statute began to run on the date that the credit report was received by the
credit agency's customers. If general damages must be presumed in credit
libel,42 the Wilson approach to the time of actual injury appears to be a more
realistic one even though it represents a substantial change in the law of libel
since it completely redefines the term "publication." In any event, there will
undoubtedly be cases in which plaintiff is unaware of the publication and of
his resultant injury until after the statute has run. Wilson, therefore, seems to
offer only an intermediate but disruptive approach to the problem.
The discovery rule, itself, is not without problems. As a judicial innovation
and an exception, rather than a rule, it is subject to broad judicial discretion
and engenders uncertainty in those areas of the law to which it is often
applied. 43 Each case may require a determination of reasonableness; the
inquiry then becomes under what set of facts will it be concluded that plaintiff
discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered
the. injury giving rise to his cause of action. 44 As the areas of the law in which
the rule is applied multiply, its desirable characteristics of fairness and
flexibility must be objectively balanced against the equally compelling need
for certainty in the law and against the increased burden on the courts which
inevitably results from their application of the rule.45
One must also examine the discovery rule, as courts have generally done,
against the background of the purposes underlying limitations statutes.4 6 The
Texas Supreme Court in Kelley stated that the public policy of forcing the
prompt assertion of claims is a particularly compelling one in defamation
actions because the nature of the evidence and of the injury itself in such
cases is often intangible. 47 The court determined, however, that this policy
was outweighed by the need to avoid an application of the limitations statute
which would deprive a conscientious plaintiff of his legal remedy.48
41. 438 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1971); see note 29 supra.
42. While most jurisdictions subscribe to the view that damages are presumed in libel, a
minority of states statutorily provide that general damages will not be presumed, at least in cases
of libel perquod. See, e:g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 45a (West 1954); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-2006 (1968).
43. See, e.g., Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277, 285-86 (1961).
44. Harper, supra note 3, at 86. See Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277(1961), for
an excellent discussion of the way in which courts approach the question of reasonableness under
the discovery rule.
45. See generally Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961).
46. See notes 3-6 supra and accompanying text.
47. 532 S.W.2d at 949.
48. The court noted that the reasons stated in Gaddis and Hays for adopting the discovery
rule also applied to Kelley:
A person will not ordinarily have any reason to suspect that he has been defamed
by the publication of a false credit report to a credit agency until he makes
application for credit to a concern which avails itself of the information furnished
by the credit agency. . . . Considering the relatively short period of limitation
for libel actions, the occasion may often arise when the injured party cannot learn
of the existence of his cause of action before the statutory period has expired.
Id. See also note 32 supra.
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B. The Broader Implications
When the legislature prescribes a time limit on the assertion of a right, it
deprives a party of the opportunity, after that time, of invoking the public
power in support of an otherwise valid claim.4 9 The discovery rule adopted by
the Texas Supreme Court in Kelley has been successfully applied in many
cases and is often a valid exception to a rigid limitations statute. When a court
uses the discovery rule, however, it should be explicit in the fact that it is
adopting an exception to the statute of limitations and not redefining the term
"accrue" or adding a new element to the cause of action on which the suit is
based."
Because the discovery rule involves broad judicial discretion and because it
circumvents the public policy considerations underlying limitations statutes,
courts should avoid employing it indiscriminately. The adoption of the
discovery rule was appropriate in Kelley, but it was not essential. A more
progressive court might have chosen Kelley as the case in which to reconsider
the questionable presumption of general damages in libel, or at least in credit
libel." By requiring plaintiff to show actual damages, the court could have
achieved the effect of the discovery rule in Kelley without adding to the
lengthening list of exceptions to the general rule regarding the running of
limitations statutes in tort actions. The point of actual injury would mark the
begirning of the limitations period. 52 Such a change in the substantive law of
credit libel would reduce the uncertainty involved in the ad hoc determina-
tions of reasonableness which accompany the discovery rule and would
reduce the burden on the courts both by rendering judicial determinations of
reasonableness unnecessary and by eliminating tenuous claims from the large
number of credit libel suits that can be expected to follow in the wake of
Kelley.
III. CONCLUSION
All claims must be held to be barred at some point. The inability of a
defendant to present a meritorious defense due to the passage of time is
certainly a valid concern. Statutes of limitations are so firmly established in
all jurisdictions that they are seldom the subject of legislative discussion.
Consequently, most changes have been realized through judicial application
and interpretation of the statutes. Judicial action, however, is necessarily
piecemeal, incomplete, and, therefore, unsatisfactory. 3 The courts lack the
49. Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 1185.
50. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. Since courts are actually changing the statute
of limitations, or legislating, when they apply the discovery rule, their reluctance to call attention
to that fact is understandable.
51. See note 42 supra.
52. Since the passage of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970), that point
should be more easily discovered and proved by plaintiff. In most cases it would undoubtedly be
the time at which he was denied credit or a job because of a defamatory credit report.
53. See Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 1185. The courts could generally avoid
unjust results by holding, as the writers suggest, that a cause of action which begins the period of
limitations refers not to the technical breach of duty which determines whether plaintiff has a
legal right, but to the existence of a practical remedy. This would be equivalent to the court's
redefining the term "accrues" or adding the element of knowledge to causes of action in torts.
See also Student Symposium-A Study of Medical Malpractice in Texas, 7 ST. MARY's L.J. 733
(1976).
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authority to establish limits beyond which a claim is absolutely and finally
barred. That is a legislative task which has been taken up by a few state
legislatures in conjunction with an evaluation of the merits of providing for
the discovery rule within select limitations statutes.' 4 It is a task which could
be profitably undertaken by the legislature in Texas.
Sue A. Tanner
54. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 340.5 (West Supp. 1976); Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.100(1952); ORE. REV. STAT. § 12.110 (1975).
[Vol. 30
